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naturalistic fallacy
In philosophical ethics, the term "naturalistic fallacy" was introduced by British philosopher G. E. Moore in his 1903 book ''Principia Ethica''.〔Moore, G.E. (''Principia Ethica'' § 10 ¶ 3 )〕 Moore argues it would be fallacious to explain that which is ''good'' reductively in terms of natural properties such as "pleasant" or "desirable".
Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from Hume's ''Treatise''. However, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism.
The phrase "naturalistic fallacy" can also be used to refer to the fallacious appeal to nature, a mistaken claim that something is good or right because it is natural (or bad or wrong because it is unnatural). See below.
==Different common uses==
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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